We can then see the first two arguments in the Metaphysical Exposition as attempting to undermine (1), and the second two arguments as attempting to undermine (2). Thus Leibniz denies that we have an a priori, singular, immediate representation of space. Instead, he thinks we begin with an empirical representation of space, remove the confused elements of that representation, and thereby obtain a clear and distinct idea, i.e., a conceptual representation of an abstract mathematical entity.[20]
This discussion is reminiscent of Kant’s fundamental disagreement with the Leibnizians regarding what Kant calls “sensibility” and “understanding.” In the General Remarks on the Aesthetic, we read:
That, therefore, our entire sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things, which contains solely that which pertains to them in themselves, but only under a heap of marks and partial representations that we can never separate from one another consciously, is a falsification of the concept of sensibility and of appearance, which renders the entire theory of them useless and empty. (A43/B60)
Kant wishes to oppose this Leibnizian attitude toward sensibility—which he goes on to label an “entirely unjust perspective” (A44/B62)—in a general but thoroughgoing way in the Aesthetic and elsewhere in the Critique. In the Amphiboly, for instance, he complains that Leibniz “left nothing for the senses but the contemptible job of confusing and upsetting the representations” of the understanding (A276/B332). Thus Kant does not merely think that we have a non-empirical, singular, immediate representation of space. He thinks—if we borrow Leibnizian terminology—that our clear and distinct representation of space is singular and immediate. For Kant, intuition can be a genuine source of clear and distinct representations.
Yes! According to Kant they (space and time) are a priori intuitions of our subjective minds. Quote
Andrew Janiak (From an Article in the Stanford Encyclopaedia where he has translated Kant):-
3.2 The Origin of Our Representation of Space
...SNIP...
KANT (Janiak's translation)
2. Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and it is an a priori representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances. (A24/B38-9)
So, above, Janiak quotes us Kant on the mental "a priority" of Space. The A and B designations are apparently from 2 different editions of The Critique of Pure Reason. I'll check...
Here is the same passage in/from a pdf version of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason page 175
KANT:
2) Space is a necessary representation, a priori, that is the ground of [A 24] all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.[ [B 39] [Cambridge Edition of The Critique of Pure Reason p. 175]
The 2 translations sound almost identical to me. You may want to check them. Both certainly state that SPACE (at least) is an apriori intuition. I'm sure that the same holds for time, according to Kant. Strange man. Modern relativistic physics is impossible on his views about how our allegedly "apriori" mental representations allegedly "control the contents of (our) perceptions". He thought all this stuff up simply in "order" to establish the rational validity of Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Physics in the face of the doubts brought to his mind by David Hume's allegedly "rational scepticism".
But every modern "big bang" physicist constantly thinks of NO SPACE and NO TIME prior to the Big Bang. Very amusing.
I think so. I am not able to remember the exact position. I have forgotten as I read about it long back about 45 years ago, when I was a student. I am now 74.
On all these things you should strictly follow what is written in your text-book. You should not deviate or imagine in a different form.
Kant's presentation of "space" as an "intuition" is similar to a fish's intuition of "water;" the fish (in this analogy, a fish swimming in the ocean, away from any land or ocean floor) does not know of any "non-water;" for the fish, "water" is intuited; likewise, Kant does not know of any "non-space;" for Kant, "space" is intuited. Thus "space" is "one space," not "many spaces"--such "spaces" are conceptual subdivisions of "space." A physicist who studies "space" uses "concepts" to conceptualize "space(s)," but according to Kant is not ever separate from "space," hence is conceptualizing about subdivisions of space. Modern physics agrees with this, and of course does not claim to "know space" per se, but accepts "space" as a "given"--Kant's "a priori." Kant's method is to focus on objects, and he understood space, time, and causality could not completely be objects of understanding, as they are prior to or surround any human attempt to focus or isolate them.
Answers & Comments
No. Quite the opposite.
We can then see the first two arguments in the Metaphysical Exposition as attempting to undermine (1), and the second two arguments as attempting to undermine (2). Thus Leibniz denies that we have an a priori, singular, immediate representation of space. Instead, he thinks we begin with an empirical representation of space, remove the confused elements of that representation, and thereby obtain a clear and distinct idea, i.e., a conceptual representation of an abstract mathematical entity.[20]
This discussion is reminiscent of Kant’s fundamental disagreement with the Leibnizians regarding what Kant calls “sensibility” and “understanding.” In the General Remarks on the Aesthetic, we read:
That, therefore, our entire sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things, which contains solely that which pertains to them in themselves, but only under a heap of marks and partial representations that we can never separate from one another consciously, is a falsification of the concept of sensibility and of appearance, which renders the entire theory of them useless and empty. (A43/B60)
Kant wishes to oppose this Leibnizian attitude toward sensibility—which he goes on to label an “entirely unjust perspective” (A44/B62)—in a general but thoroughgoing way in the Aesthetic and elsewhere in the Critique. In the Amphiboly, for instance, he complains that Leibniz “left nothing for the senses but the contemptible job of confusing and upsetting the representations” of the understanding (A276/B332). Thus Kant does not merely think that we have a non-empirical, singular, immediate representation of space. He thinks—if we borrow Leibnizian terminology—that our clear and distinct representation of space is singular and immediate. For Kant, intuition can be a genuine source of clear and distinct representations.
Yes.
Yes! According to Kant they (space and time) are a priori intuitions of our subjective minds. Quote
Andrew Janiak (From an Article in the Stanford Encyclopaedia where he has translated Kant):-
3.2 The Origin of Our Representation of Space
...SNIP...
KANT (Janiak's translation)
2. Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and it is an a priori representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances. (A24/B38-9)
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Stanford Copyright © 2016 by
Andrew Janiak <[email protected]>Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
So, above, Janiak quotes us Kant on the mental "a priority" of Space. The A and B designations are apparently from 2 different editions of The Critique of Pure Reason. I'll check...
Here is the same passage in/from a pdf version of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason page 175
KANT:
2) Space is a necessary representation, a priori, that is the ground of [A 24] all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.[ [B 39] [Cambridge Edition of The Critique of Pure Reason p. 175]
The 2 translations sound almost identical to me. You may want to check them. Both certainly state that SPACE (at least) is an apriori intuition. I'm sure that the same holds for time, according to Kant. Strange man. Modern relativistic physics is impossible on his views about how our allegedly "apriori" mental representations allegedly "control the contents of (our) perceptions". He thought all this stuff up simply in "order" to establish the rational validity of Euclidean Geometry and Newtonian Physics in the face of the doubts brought to his mind by David Hume's allegedly "rational scepticism".
But every modern "big bang" physicist constantly thinks of NO SPACE and NO TIME prior to the Big Bang. Very amusing.
Kevin
I think so. I am not able to remember the exact position. I have forgotten as I read about it long back about 45 years ago, when I was a student. I am now 74.
On all these things you should strictly follow what is written in your text-book. You should not deviate or imagine in a different form.
Kant's presentation of "space" as an "intuition" is similar to a fish's intuition of "water;" the fish (in this analogy, a fish swimming in the ocean, away from any land or ocean floor) does not know of any "non-water;" for the fish, "water" is intuited; likewise, Kant does not know of any "non-space;" for Kant, "space" is intuited. Thus "space" is "one space," not "many spaces"--such "spaces" are conceptual subdivisions of "space." A physicist who studies "space" uses "concepts" to conceptualize "space(s)," but according to Kant is not ever separate from "space," hence is conceptualizing about subdivisions of space. Modern physics agrees with this, and of course does not claim to "know space" per se, but accepts "space" as a "given"--Kant's "a priori." Kant's method is to focus on objects, and he understood space, time, and causality could not completely be objects of understanding, as they are prior to or surround any human attempt to focus or isolate them.
No, not true... The existence of space-time is an actual physical fact, not a matter of previous philosophical opinion.